PODCAST Review of: The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History, by Serhii Plokhy

 

 

https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-95e8i-1585a2a

Review of:  The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History, by Serhii Plokhy

Reviewed by Stan Prager, Regarp Book Blog

Review of: The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History, by Serhii Plokhy

On February 24, 2022, Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, an act of unprovoked aggression not seen in Europe since World War II that summoned up ominous historical parallels. Memories of Munich resurfaced, as well as the price paid for inaction. The West heard terrifying if unmistakable echoes in the rumble of armored vehicles and boots on the ground, and this time responded rapidly and unhesitatingly to both condemn Russia and steadfastly stand with Ukraine. Post-Trump—the former president seemed to have a kind of boyhood crush on Russia’s strongman Vladimir Putin—the United States, led now by the Biden Administration, acted decisively to partner in near-unanimity with the European Union and a newly re-emboldened NATO to provide political, economic, and especially military aid to beleaguered Ukrainians.

The world watched in horror as Russian missiles took aim at civilian targets. But there was also widespread admiration for Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who defied offers to assist his flight to a safe haven abroad by reportedly declaring that: “The fight is here: I need ammunition, not a ride.” But while most Ukrainians were indeed grateful for the outpouring of critical support from abroad, there was also background noise fraught with frustration: Russia had actually been making war on Ukraine since 2014, even if much of the planet never seemed to notice it.

Since, at least until very recently, most Americans could not easily locate Ukraine on a map, it is perhaps less than surprising that few were aware of the active Russian belligerency in Ukraine for the eight years prior to the full scale invasion that made cable news headlines. Many still do not know what the current war is really about. That vast sea of the uninformed is the best audience for The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History [2023] by award-winning Harvard professor and historian Serhii Plokhy.

Map courtesy Nations Online Project

The conflict in Ukraine has spawned two competing narratives, and although only one is fact-based, the other—advanced by Putin and his neofascist allies in Europe and the United States—has gained dangerous currency as of late. In the fantasy “world according to Putin,” Ukraine is styled as a “near abroad” component integral to Russia with a shared heritage and culture that makes it inseparable from the Russian state. At the same time, Ukraine has brought invasion upon itself by seeking to ally itself with Russia’s enemies. And, somehow concomitantly, Ukraine is also a rogue state run by Nazis—never mind that Zelenskyy himself is of Jewish heritage—that obligates Moscow’s intervention in order to protect the Ukrainian and Russian populations under threat. That none of this is true and that much of it is neither logical nor even rational makes no difference. Putin and his puppets just keep repeating it, because as we know from Goebbels’ time, if you keep repeating a lie it becomes the truth.

And that truth is more complicated, so of course far more difficult to rebut. It is always challenging for nuance to compete with talking points, especially when the latter are reinforced in well-orchestrated efforts peddled by a sophisticated state-run propaganda machine that has an international reach. Ukraine and Russia, as well as Belarus, do indeed share a cultural heritage that can be traced back to the ninth century Kyivan Rus’ state, but then a similar claim can be made about France and Germany and their roots in the Carolingian Empire a bit farther to the west—with the same lack of relevance to their respective rights to sovereignty in the modern day. And Russian origins actually belong to fourteenth century Muscovy, not Kyiv. In its long history, Ukraine has been incorporated into Tsarist Russia and its successor state, the Soviet Union, but its vast parcels were also at various times controlled by Mongols, by the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, by Austria, and even by a Turkish khanate. Yet, Ukraine always stubbornly clung to its distinct sovereign identity, even when—like Poland under partition—it was not a sovereign nation, and even as the struggle to achieve statehood ever persisted. That is quite a story in itself, and no one tells that story better than Plokhy himself in his erudite text, The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine [2015, rev.2021], a dense, well-researched, deep dive into the past that at once fully establishes Ukraine’s right to exist, while expertly placing it into the context of Europe’s past and present. Alas, it leans to the academic in tone and thus poses a challenge to a more general audience.

Fortunately, The Russo-Ukrainian War is far more readable and accessible, without sacrificing the impressive scholarship that marks the foundation of all Plokhy’s work. And thankfully the course of Ukraine’s recent past—the focus here—is far less convoluted than in prior centuries. While contrary to Putin’s claim, Ukraine is not an inextricable element of the Russian state, their modern history has certainly between intertwined. But that changed in the post-Soviet era, and the author traces the paths of each in the decades since Ukraine’s independence and Russia’s drift under Putin’s rule from a fledgling democracy to neofascist authoritarianism.

Ukraine became a sovereign state in 1991 upon the dissolution of the USSR, along with a number of former Soviet republics in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Overnight, Ukraine became the second largest European nation (after Russia) and found itself hosting the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal on its territory. As part of an agreement dubbed the “Trilateral Statement,” Ukraine transferred its nuclear weapons to Russia for destruction in exchange for security assurances from Russia, Britain, and the United States. This crucial moment is too often overlooked in debates over aid to Ukraine. Not only has Russia plainly violated this agreement that the United States remains obligated to uphold, but there surely could have been no Russian invasion had Ukraine hung on to those nukes.

Ukraine suffered mightily in its decades as a Soviet republic—most notably during Stalin’s infamous man-made famine known as the “Holodomor” (1932-33) that killed millions of Ukrainians—but 1991 and its aftermath saw a peaceful divorce and both nations go their separate ways. Each suffered from economic dislocation, corruption, and political instability at this new dawn, but despite shortcomings throughout this transition, Ukrainians looked to the West, saw greater integration with Europe as central to their future, and embraced democracy, if sometimes imperfectly.

Meanwhile, Russia stumbled. Some of this can be laid to missed opportunities by the West for more significant economic aid and firmer support for emerging democratic institutions when Russia needed it most, but much of it was organic, as well. Vladimir Putin, a little-known figure, stepped into a leadership role. With slow, calculated, and somewhat astonishing proficiency, former KGB operative Putin gradually dismantled democracy while generally preserving its outward forms, cementing his control in an increasingly authoritarian state—one which most recently seems barreling towards a kind of Stalinist totalitarianism. Along the way, Putin crafted an ideological framework for his vision of a new Russia, born again as a “great power,” by borrowing heavily from 1930s era fascism, resurrected and transformed for the millennium.

Interestingly, while I was reading The Russo-Ukrainian War, I also read The Road to Unfreedom [2018], Timothy Snyder’s brilliant study of how neofascism has gripped the West and Putin’s pivotal role in its course: interfering in US elections, sponsoring Trump’s candidacy, seeking to destabilize NATO, encouraging Brexit in the UK—and an aggressive revanchist effort to annex Ukraine to an emergent twenty-first century Russian Empire. Snyder both confirms the general outline of Plokhy’s narrative and zooms out to put a wider lens on the dangerous implications in these cleverly choreographed diabolical maneuvers that go well beyond the borders of Ukraine to put threat to the very future of Western democracy. As such, Putin may imagine himself as a kind of latter-day Peter the Great, and sometimes act as Stalin, but the historical figure he most closely imitates is Adolf Hitler.

Like Hitler, Putin first sought to achieve his objectives without war. For Ukraine, that meant bribery, disinformation, election interference, and other tactics. And Putin nearly succeeded with former president Viktor Yanukovych—who attempted to effect a sharp turn away from the West while placing Ukraine firmly into Russia’s orbit—until he was toppled from power and fled to Moscow in 2014. A furious Putin replayed Hitler’s moves in Sudetenland and in the Austrian Anschluss: puppet separatists agitated for independence and launched civil war in Ukraine’s east, and Crimea was annexed by Russia following a mock referendum. The war in Ukraine had begun.

The Obama Administration, in concert with the West, responded with economic sanctions that proved tepid, at best, and went on with their business. Ukrainians fought courageously in the east to defend what remained of their territory against Russian aggression. Meanwhile, Donald Trump moved into the Oval Office, voicing overt hostility towards NATO while projecting a startling brand of comraderie with Vladimir Putin. Snyder wryly observes in The Road to Unfreedom that the last advisor to the last pro-Russian president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, was none other than Paul Manafort, who then became the campaign manager to candidate Donald Trump. You can’t make this stuff up.

If Snyder sometimes leans to the polemic, Plokhy strictly sticks to history, even if the two authors’ perspectives essentially run parallel. The Russo-Ukrainian War is most of all a well-written, competent history of those two nations and of their collisions on and off the battlefield that spawned a full-scale war—one that did not need to occur except to further Putin’s neofascist nationalist ambitions. If I can find fault, it is only that in his sympathy for the Ukrainian cause, Plokhy is sometimes too forgiving of its key players. In the current conflict, Ukraine is most certainly in the right, but that is not to say that it can do no wrong. Still, especially as I can locate much of the same material in Snyder’s work, I cannot point to any inaccuracies. The author knows his subject, demonstrates rigorous research, and can cite his sources, which means there are plenty of notes for those who want to delve deeper. I should add that this edition also boasts great maps that are quite helpful for those less familiar with the geography. Plokhy is an accomplished scholar, but an advanced degree is not necessary to comprehend the contents. Anyone can come to this book and walk away with a wealth of knowledge that will cut through the smokescreen of propaganda broadcast not only on Russian TV, but in certain corners of the American media.

This review goes to press on the heels of Putin’s almost-certain assassination of his most prominent political opponent, Alexei Navalny, in an Arctic gulag where he had been confined under harsh conditions for championing democracy and standing against the war in Ukraine, and just days away from the second anniversary of the Russian invasion, as Ukrainian forces abandon the city of Avdiivka and struggle to hold on elsewhere while American aid withers under pressure from Trump’s MAGA allies in the House of Representatives, who went on recess in a deliberate tactic to sidestep a vote on aid to Ukraine already approved by the Senate. Trump himself, the likely Republican nomination for president this year, recently underscored his longstanding enmity towards NATO by publicly declaring—in a “Bizarro World” inverse of the mutual defense guaranteed in Article 5—that he would invite Russia to attack any member nation behind on its dues, a chilling glimpse of what another Trump term in the White House would mean for the security of both Europe and America. Trump once again lives up to his alarming caricature in Timothy Snyder’s The Road to Unfreedom: the fictional character “Donald Trump successful businessman” that was manufactured by Putin and then marketed to the American public. And just a week before Navalny’s murder, former FOX News host Tucker Carlson conducted a softball “interview” with Putin that gifted him a platform to assert Russia’s right to Ukraine and even cast blame on Poland for Hitler’s invasion in 1939. We have truly come full circle, and it is indeed the return of history.

These are grim moments for Ukraine. But also for America, for the West, for the free world. With all the propaganda, the misinformation, the often fake news hysteria of social media, the average American voter may not know what to believe about Ukraine. For a dose of reality, I would urge them to read The Russo-Ukrainian War. And, given the stakes this November—not only for Ukraine’s sovereignty but for the very survival of American democracy—I would advise them to take great care when casting their ballot, because a vote for Putin’s candidate is a vote for Putin, and perhaps the end of the West as we know it.

 

Link to my review of:  The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine, by Serhii Plokhy

Link to my review of:  The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America, by Timothy Snyder

 

 

 

PODCAST Review of: Ota Benga: The Pygmy in the Zoo, by Phillips Verner Bradford & Harvey Blume

 

https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-tr6xc-15633f8

Review of:  Ota Benga: The Pygmy in the Zoo, by Phillips Verner Bradford & Harvey Blume

Reviewed by Stan Prager, Regarp Book Blog

Review of: Ota Benga: The Pygmy in the Zoo, by Phillips Verner Bradford & Harvey Blume

In 1904, the notorious Apache warrior Geronimo, now in his mid-seventies, was a federal prisoner of war on loan to the St. Louis World’s Fair, which belongs to our nation’s uncomfortable collective memory for its numerous ethnographic exhibits of so-called “primitive” humans which included, in addition to Native Americans, the Tlingit, indigenous to Alaska, and the Igorot, an aboriginal population from the Philippines who were billed as “headhunters,” as well as Congolese pygmies. Geronimo developed rapport with one of latter, an amiable nineteen year old Mbuti tribesman named Ota Benga, imaginatively advertised as a “cannibal,” who stood four foot eleven inches and whose smile showcased teeth ceremonially sharpened to fine points. The old medicine man presented him with an arrowhead as a gift; they were, of course, all in this kind of zoo together.

But only two years later that very metaphor materialized for Ota, whom after a brief stay at New York’s American Museum of Natural History found himself on display in the Monkey House at the Bronx Zoo, where he hung his hammock, wearing a loincloth and carrying a bow and arrow, or wandering the zoo grounds accompanied by an orangutan he had grown attached to—a captivating if unpaid attraction for amused onlookers. Just after the turn of century, fresh from the imperialist adventure that was the Spanish-American War, which had compelled Filipinos to trade one colonial power for another, “civilized” Americans delighted in the spectacle of gawking at “savages” in various contrived natural habitats—especially, it turned out, in of all places, New York City!

The hapless Ota’s surprising story, from his birth in central Africa through his unlikely travels across the United States, is the subject of Ota Benga: The Pygmy in the Zoo [1992], an entertaining if occasionally uneven account by dual authors Phillips Verner Bradford and Harvey Blume. It is also, actually, a dual biography, as Ota shares much space in the narrative with Samual Phillips Verner—the grandfather of one of the authors—an eccentric missionary who visited the Congo on a “specimen-gathering mission” for the Fair, and “collected” Ota Benga as one of those “specimens.” There are grander themes to parse, as well, that this set of authors may not have been up to. These run the gamut from the oppression that reigned in the Jim Crow south to the cruelty that characterized the Congo, and—especially—to this particular moment in time when an America now equipped with automobiles and electricity and even manned flight could yet shamelessly put human beings on display to at once juxtapose with and champion their alleged superiors shouldering their “white man’s burden.”

Bradford, an engineer who was inspired to write a biography of his colorful grandfather, recognized that Ota Benga was the hook that would attract readers, and set out to do the research. Blume was brought in to polish the manuscript. Neither were trained historians, which perhaps makes the finished product more readable, if less reliable; more on that later.

This storied grandfather, the aforementioned Samual Phillips Verner, was born in post-Civil War South Carolina to a former slaveholding family and grew up furnished with the deep-seated racism typical to his class and his time. Verner emerges here as an intense, academic prodigy who lingers upon troubling moral quandaries of right and wrong, while suffering from alternating episodes of mental illness—he once insisted he was the Hapsburg Emperor—and religious fervor. Throughout, he takes comfort in the Daniel Defoe novel Robinson Crusoe, as well as the real life adventures of Henry Morton Stanley and David Livingstone in distant, exotic Africa. The sum total of all this was to coalesce in Verner’s calling as a missionary to what was then commonly referred to as the “Dark Continent.” It is in Africa that he demonstrates his intelligence, his charm, his many capabilities, and his propensity for both earning enemies and cementing friendships. He also wrestles with the inherent prejudices he carries from the deep south that come to be challenged by the realities of the human experience. And, as in his boyhood, there are disturbing moral dilemmas to resolve. But what becomes increasingly clear as the pages are turned is that Verner is first and foremost a narcissist, and resolutions for any paradox of morality are always obtained by what suits Verner’s own circumstances most comfortably and most conveniently.

By his own account, Verner’s time in the Congo consisted of remarkable exploits that saw him establish rapport with various native peoples, including pygmies, as well as form an unlikely kind of alliance with a dangerous, otherwise unapproachable tribal king, and a near-fatal episode when he impaled his leg on a poisoned stake set for an animal trap. Along the way, he distinguishes himself by his courage, quick-thinking, and ingenuity—like a character out of Defoe, perhaps. Did it all really happen? Bradford reports Verner’s saga as history, although it is based almost entirely on his grandfather’s own recollections. As such, the reader cannot help but question the reliability of a fellow who once believed himself to be the Hapsburg Emperor!

African pygmies, much like the Khoisan peoples, have an ancient indigenous lineage that are genetically divergent from all other human populations. They may or may not be descendants of paleolithic hunter-gatherers of the central African rainforest. In Ota Benga’s time, the Mbuti, nomadic hunters, ranged within the artificially drawn borders of the Congo Free State, a vast territory that was for a time the personal fiefdom of Belgium’s King Leopold II, a land infamous for the widespread atrocities committed by Leopold’s private army, the dreaded Force Publique, that enforced strict rubber collection quotas through extreme methods of murder and mutilation. A human hand had to be turned in for every bullet issued to prove these were not wasted, so baskets of hands—including children’s hands—became symbolic of Leopold’s “Free State,” a realm of horrors that inspired Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness. For those who have read Adam Hochschild’s magnificent work, King Leopold’s Ghost, there is nothing new here, but two of its protagonists, black missionary William Sheppard and Irish activist Roger Casement, who campaigned against Leopold’s reign of terror, turn up in this book, as well. Verner, it seems, was surprisingly unmoved by the carnage about him.

Verner contracted malaria. That illness, his leg injury, and the overall dissatisfaction of mission officials with his performance conspired to send him back to America, where he became famous for his reported feats and, based upon his background, won the assignment of procuring pygmies for The Louisiana Purchase Exposition (also known as the St. Louis World’s Fair). So, eight years later he returned on expedition, with the blessings of King Leopold himself, and in an accidental encounter with the Baschilele tribe stumbled upon Ota Benga at a slave market. Apparently Ota, away from his camp on a solo elephant hunt, as pygmies were wont to do, had returned to find piles of corpses, including his wife and children—victims of the Force Publique. He and other survivors were sold into slavery. Verner could not believe his good fortune: he purchased Ota for “a pound of salt and a bolt of cloth.” [p103] He later recruited other more willing volunteers, and set sail for home. The Thirteenth Amendment forbidding chattel slavery was ratified nearly four decades prior, but that proved not to be a barrier to Verner’s transport of Ota to the United States.

That is just the beginning of this fascinating story! There is much more to come, which makes this book, although flawed on some levels, well worth the read. Those who have studied the American Civil War and the antebellum south are familiar with the nuanced relationships that can develop between the enslaved and those who hold them as property. A bond developed between Verner and Ota that was even more complicated than that. Verner may have purchased Ota and dutifully turned him over to the World’s Fair, but he later freely returned him to Africa. Yet, after a time, Ota, widowed once more after losing a second wife to snakebite, found himself with little to hold him there and a taste for the excitement he had found in America. Thus, he made an enthusiastic return to the US with Verner. But things were not destined to go well for either of them.

Verner had visions of grandeur that did not translate into either the wealth or recognition he sought. He seemed to genuinely care about Ota’s welfare, but that fell to neglect as his own fortunes dwindled, and Ota wound up in that degrading display at the Bronx Zoo. He was not there very long. His rescue came from unlikely quarters: African American clergymen, chafing at their own second-class status, were rightly appalled at the humiliating spectacle of Ota at the zoo, which they likewise perceived as advancing Darwinism, an abomination for their Christian faith. Ota went first to an orphanage in the Bronx, and later to Lynchburg, Virginia, where a kindly patron arranged to have his sharpened teeth capped, fitted him out in suitable clothing, sent him to school, and found him work at a tobacco factory, where he was known as Otto Bingo. But Ota, who in his heyday with Verner had been a celebrity of sorts on travels that had once even taken him to Mardi Gras in New Orleans, found himself lonely and alienated. One day in 1916, he pried the caps off his teeth and shot himself. He was about thirty-three years old.

In the end, I longed for more information about Ota and less about Verner. This volume, while enhanced by both wonderful photographs and a thick appendix of press clippings from the day, is conspicuously absent of endnotes—which would be useful for the reader anxious to separate fact from fiction in Verner’s likely embellishments. Still, despite its limitations, I enjoyed this book and would recommend it.

My Review of: King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terrorism and Heroism in Colonial Africa, by Adam Hochschild

Ota Benga is referenced, with much relevance, in Angela Saini’s fine work, reviewed here:  Superior: The Return of Race Science

 

PODCAST Review of: The Children of Athena: Greek Intellectuals in the Age of Rome: 150 BC-400 AD, by Charles Freeman

https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-8sha3-1550a13

Review of:  The Children of Athena: Greek Intellectuals in the Age of Rome: 150 BC-400 AD, by Charles Freeman

Reviewed by Stan Prager, Regarp Book Blog

Review of: The Children of Athena: Greek Intellectuals in the Age of Rome: 150 BC-400 AD, by Charles Freeman

In 399 BCE, Socrates was condemned to death, a tragic punctuation mark to the celebrated fifth century that had Athens and Sparta and the multitude of other poleis witness first the repulse of the mighty Persian Empire, the flourish that was the Age of Pericles, and then the carnage of the Peloponnesian War that for nearly three decades battered Greek civilization and culminated in Athenian defeat. In that same era, hardly anyone had heard of Rome, humiliated just shortly thereafter when sacked by Gauls in 390 BCE. A mere century and a half later, the Greeks were themselves subjects of a Rome that had become master of the Mediterranean. But in victory or defeat, sovereign or not, the pulse never failed to beat in the poleis—or beyond it. The life of Socrates, likely embellished, was told most famously by Plato, who founded his Academy in Athens in 387 BCE. Plato’s pupil Aristotle later established his own school, the Lyceum, and served as tutor to Alexander the Great, who in his vast conquest spread Hellenism across the east. By the time that Egypt, the last parcel of territory once claimed by Alexander, fell to Roman rule in 31 BCE, Greek thought prevailed more than a thousand miles from Attica and the Peloponnesus, and it was to dominate Roman intellectual life for centuries to come. As Roman poet Horace once observed: “Captive Greece took captive her savage conqueror and brought the arts to rustic Latium.”

That story is subject to a superlative treatment in The Children of Athena: Greek Intellectuals in the Age of Rome:150 BC-400 AD [2023], a fascinating and engaging work that is the latest to spring from the extremely talented pen of acclaimed classicist Charles Freeman. In a departure from the thick tomes and deep dives into intellectual history that have made his reputation, such as The Closing of the Western Mind1 [2003], and its sequel of sorts, The Reopening of the Western Mind2 [2020], this delightful survey sacrifices none of the scholarship Freeman is known for while expanding his appeal to both an academic and a popular audience. Even better, the volume is structured such that it can just as suitably be approached as a random perusal of out of sequence episodes as a cover-to-cover read.

Books of history often have a slow build, but not this one. The reader is instantly hooked by the “Prologue,” which features an adaptation of The Banquet, a hilarious satirical work by Lucian of Samosata, a second-century CE Hellenized Syrian who wrote in Greek, that has representatives of virtually every school of philosophy attending a wedding feast that degenerates from debate and dispute to debauchery—and even a full scale brawl! Attendees include Stoics, Platonists, Peripatetics, Epicureans, Cynics, and various hangers-on. The point, of courses, for the purpose of Freeman’s work, is both the considerable diversity that was manifested in Greek thought, as well as how prevalent that proved to be in the immensity of an empire that stretched from Mauretania to Armenia.

To animate this compelling cultural history, Freeman has chosen a select group of representative figures. Those grounded in the classics will recognize most if perhaps not all of them, which only serves as underscore to the sheer numbers of Greeks who took leading roles in Roman life over the many hundreds of years that spanned the time when Greece succumbed to Roman conquest in the second century BCE to the fall of Rome in the west in the fifth century CE. There are philosophers, of course, such as Epictetus and Plotinus, but there is also the historian Polybius, the biographer Plutarch, the geographer Strabo, the traveler Pausanias, the astronomer Ptolemy, the surgeon Galen, and a dozen others. Chapters for each are comprised of biographical sketches with an exploration of their significance, as well as the imprint their legacies left upon later Western Civilization. Included too are a number of interludes that explore wider themes to better place these individuals in context to their times.

Rome’s was a martial society not known for organic cultural achievements, at least not until much later in the course of its history. Greek art and epic, already deeply influential on the Etruscans that Rome supplanted in their geography, came to fill that vacuum. The syncretism that gradually integrated Greek mythology into equivalent Roman gods and goddesses, with appropriate name changes, similarly saw Greek culture increasingly borrowed and incorporated over time, even as this latter process met with a sometimes fierce resistance by conservative Roman elites. Philosophy proved especially unwelcome at first, as perhaps best highlighted in a report by Plutarch of an Athenian delegation to Rome in 155 BCE that saw a certain Carneades, a philosopher associated with antidogmatic skepticism, argue convincingly to an audience in favor of one proposition the first day, only to return the next and masterfully rebut his own position—to the horror of Cato the Elder! But such attitudes were not to prevail; Greek philosophy was to dominate Roman intellectual life, even as Christianity gained traction—and some of Freeman’s Greeks are in fact Christian—until repressed by the Church in the last decades prior to the fall of Rome. This was especially facilitated by the Pax Romana that characterized the first two centuries of empire, a period of relative peace and stability that allowed ideas, including spirited philosophical debate, to spread freely across long distances. The Emperor Marcus Aurelius (reigned 161 to 180 CE) was himself a Stoic philosopher!

Freeman’s book demonstrates the vitality of Greek thought in Roman life not merely through the various schools of philosophy, but even more importantly in the realms of science, medicine, and scholarship. Long ago, in my own studies of ancient Greece, I read both Polybius (c.200–c.118 BCE) and Plutarch (46-119 CE) while carelessly overlooking the implications in that these were Greeks who resided in Rome. Plutarch himself even became a Roman citizen. It is a telling reminder that Greeks remained a critical influence upon Western Civilization—long after their city-states ceased to be anything other than place names on Roman maps.

I once ran across a claim of Christian triumphalism in the literature that argued that the rise of Christianity was enabled by a paganism that had so run its course that it had doomed itself to obsolescence, leaving a gaping spiritual hole that begged for a new, more fulfilling religious experience for the masses. It’s a nice fairy tale for the faithful, but lacks support in the scholarship. Even as the “catastrophic” notion of the demise of polytheism (associated with Gibbon) has given way to the more realistic “long and slow” view by historians, it is often surprising to discover how vibrant paganism remained, well into late antiquity. And the best evidence for that is the flourishing of Greek philosophy, and the paganism associated with it, in the Roman world—both which finally fell victim to the totalitarianism of the early Christian Church that at first discouraged and later prohibited anything that strayed from established doctrine. With that in mind, The Children of Athena serves as a kind of prequel to Freeman’s magnificent The Closing of the Western Mind, which chronicled the course of events that came to crush independent inquiry for a millennium to follow in the Western world.

There is possibly no more chilling metaphor for this than in one of the final chapters of The Children of Athena that is given to Hypatia (c.350-415 CE), a Neoplatonist philosopher and mathematician who lived in Alexandria, Egypt in the twilight of the empire. Hypatia, the rare female of her times who was a philosophical and scientific thinker, fell afoul of a local bishop and was murdered by a Christian mob that stripped her naked and scraped her to death with shards of roof tiles. And so the Western mind indeed did close.

For the record, I have come to know Charles Freeman over the years, and we correspond via email from time to time. I read portions of drafts of The Children of Athena as it was coming together, and offered my ideas, for whatever those might be worth, to help polish the narrative. As such, I was honored to see my name appear in the book’s “Acknowledgements.” But I am not a paid reviewer, and I would never praise a title that did not warrant it, regardless of my connection to the author. I genuinely enjoyed it, and would highly recommend it.

This is, in fact, one of those works that is difficult to fault, despite my glaring critical eye. Freeman’s depth in the field is on display and impressive, as is his ability to articulate a wide range of sometimes arcane concepts in a comprehensible fashion. I suppose if I were to find a flaw, it would be for the lack of much needed back matter. Readers may bemoan the absence of a “cast of characters” to catalog the names of the major and minor individuals that occur in the text, a key to philosophical schools and unfamiliar terminology, as well as maps of ancient cities and towns. Still, that is a minor quibble that should best be taken up with the publisher rather than the author, and hardly diminishes the overall achievement of this book, which does include copious notes and a fine concluding chapter that for my part found me motivated to go back to my own shelves and read more about the men and women that people The Children of Athena.

 

1 A link to my review of: Review of: The Closing of the Western Mind: The Rise of Faith and the Fall of Reason by Charles Freeman

2 A link to my review of: The Reopening of the Western Mind: The Resurgence of Intellectual Life from the End of Antiquity to the Dawn of the Enlightenment, by Charles Freeman

 

PODCAST Review of: The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America, by Timothy Snyder

https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-739hz-1549114

Review of: The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America, by Timothy Snyder

Reviewed by Stan Prager, Regarp Book Blog

Review of: The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America, by Timothy Snyder

When Hillary Clinton compared Russian President Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler after Russia occupied Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in early March 2014, I thought she had gone too far—and so did many of her critics. But Clinton’s analogy turned out to be far more prescient than hyperbolic. When, just weeks later, Putin boldly annexed Crimea following a mock referendum, and then sponsored puppet separatists to launch civil war in the Donbas in Ukraine’s east, she proved that her memory of European history—of Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland and the Austrian Anschluss—correctly detected echoes in Putin’s recourse to fake ballots and real bullets.

Like most Americans, I believed at the time that the economic sanctions the Obama Administration imposed upon Russia represented a sound, measured policy that sidestepped unnecessary overreaction, rather than what was in retrospect clearly a tepid, ineffective response, especially given that shortly thereafter Russian proxies shot down a commercial airliner over Ukraine that killed nearly three hundred innocents. Hardly as blatant as Munich in 1938, the lack of meaningful repercussions here certainly emboldened Putin on the path to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine that came in 2022—an act of unprovoked aggression not seen in Europe since World War II. It has hardly gone as planned, of course, but then it is not over yet, either.

Along the way, some have suggested that Putin’s fantasies of himself as a kind of latter-day Peter the Great have instead degenerated into a Putin-as-Stalin motif, but that strikes as somewhat inelegant. Rather, while Clinton was pilloried for flashing that “Hitler card” back when, she was indeed on to something. There is far more than mimicry in the Russian president’s seizure of a neighbor’s territory and denial of its very sovereignty, most significantly in the pretext and justification for his acts. Because when you deconstruct Putin, you find him not only glancing backward over his shoulder at der Führer, but working with quiet determination over the last two decades to reinvent that brand of fascism for the twenty-first century.

That Putin turns out to be the driving force behind the neofascism that has had the Western world increasingly in its sway since the turn of millennium is just one of the insights to emerge in The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America [2018], the at-turns brilliant and chilling work by Yale professor and acclaimed historian Timothy Snyder, which traces the roots and more recent rise of the forces of the undemocratic right, along with its sometimes Byzantine web of connections that stretch to Viktor Orban’s Hungary, Britain’s Brexit, and Trump’s MAGA—and all too many strands lead back to the Kremlin, some crisscrossing Ukraine on the way. In a narrative that is engaging and well-written, if often somewhat complex, Snyder channels the philosophical, psychological, and ideological to reveal the dangerous resurrection of principles that were fundamental to 1930s fascism, retooled and even transmogrified to suit new generations, new audiences. What’s especially striking about Snyder’s analysis is that this book, published in 2018, anticipates so much of what is to follow.

Fascism, born in Mussolini’s Italy almost a century ago, takes on many forms that have been catalogued by a number of scholars and writers, including—famously—Umberto Eco. Laurence W. Britt[1] compiled perhaps the most comprehensive list of its known characteristics, although the specific expression can vary widely.  Central to all is ultranationalism, typically coupled with a yearning for a mythical, bygone era of greatness that has been lost to liberal decadence. Mussolini looked to the glory of ancient Rome; Hitler to the more recent past of Imperial Germany. Contemporary neofascism is no different. Putin mourns the collapse of the Soviet Union and its larger sphere of influence that encompassed Eastern Europe. In the United States, it simmers beneath the ultrapatriotic flag-waving surface of Trump’s “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) movement as a dog-whistle that fondly looks back on a “whiter” America when blacks were more complacent and “brown” immigrants were not threatening our borders. (Trump himself recently and unrepentantly paraphrased Hitler with talk of immigrants “poisoning the blood” of America.) Racism is always a part of the equation. Hitler’s hatred of the Jews stood out in stark underscore, but antisemitism ever lurks. In the U.S., it is masked in the thinly veiled contempt spewed upon billionaire George Soros, who acts as a convenient placeholder for “liberal Jews.”

But targets of racism are not alone: they share space with a crowded field of “enemies” who threaten the harmony of the state and serve as scapegoats for society’s alleged ailments, including: communists, foreigners, lawbreakers, intellectual elites, nonconformist artists, members of the media, organized labor, minorities, feminists, homosexuals, etc. There’s always a list of grievances and national ills, real and imagined, for which the latter can be held responsible—and serve as a unifying force that must be opposed by those who seek to restore the nation’s greatness. Religion is often an ally in the combating of sin. There is an obsession with national security expressed by rampant militarism that on the domestic front translates to a hyperbolic law-and-order fixation on crime and punishment. Individuals and institutions alike are demonized. Since fascists have no respect for human rights, opponents are dehumanized, transformed into “the other,” deserving of persecution for both their actions and their ideas.  Violence and the threat of violence are ever present or looming. Among institutions, democracy itself is the foremost adversary, and an early casualty to authoritarianism. The fascist leader becomes the self-appointed savior: only he and his corrupt cronies can solve the disorders of the state, but only if he is granted the absolute authority to do so. Elections become a sham: if you lose, just declare victory anyway. Keep lying until the lie becomes the truth.

The Road to Unfreedom identifies the commonality of these elements in right-wing parties across Europe and in the United States. It turns out to be pretty shocking how closely each of these movements resemble one another—and how similar they are to the fascism once associated with Mussolini, Franco, and Hitler! But the real epiphany is not only the role Putin has played in inspiring and encouraging today’s brand of neofascism, but how frequently the contemporary manifestations originated with Putin himself.  Snyder chronicles how Putin managed to dismantle democracy in Russia while maintaining its outward forms, and how that has served as a blueprint of sleight-of-hand authoritarianism for his imitators abroad. (Donald Trump is just one of them.)  But, more critically still, he details how it is that Putin resurrected and reinvented fascism for the new century by returning to the philosophy and ideology of fascists of the past while embracing and encouraging the neofascist thinkers of the present.

A large piece of The Road to Unfreedom is given to events in Ukraine, to Putin’s focused attempt to recover for Russia what for him is the central component of what he calls the “near abroad,” the now independent successor states once incorporated into the USSR. For those who have read Serhii Plokhy’s landmark chronicle, The Gates of Europe[2], or his more recent book, The Russo-Ukrainian War, there is nothing new here. But, significantly, Snyder deftly locates Putin’s brand of revanchism in the fascist-friendly political philosophy of the right that thrived before he was born, and which has been reshaped, with Putin’s patronage, for our own times. He identifies Ivan Ilyin (1883-1954), a White Russian émigré who admired both Mussolini and Hitler, as a major influence on Putin. Ilyin was a key proponent for the socio-political “Eurasianism” that Putin holds dear, an antidemocratic imperialism that claims for Russia a distinct civilization that transcends geography and ethnicity to command a vast territory ruled by the Russian state. Perhaps today’s most prominent Eurasianist is Aleksandr Dugin, said to be close to the Kremlin. The point is that political philosophy serves as underpinning to Putin’s opportunism. It is not simply about seizing territory. There is a long-term plan.

Snyder traces the roots of “the road to unfreedom” to the naivety of a West swelling with triumphalism in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, blinded by what he brands the “politics of inevitability:” individuals and ideas were seen as obsolete, supplanted instead by an unyielding optimism in the conviction that the marriage of capitalism and democracy guaranteed ineluctable progress to a favorable future. The opposite of the “politics of inevitability,” Snyder argues, is “the politics of eternity,” that offers instead a cyclical tale of victimhood inflicted upon the state by age-old threats and enemies that ever reappear and must be vanquished. In the politics of eternity, only one man—and misogyny dictates that it must be a man—can save the nation, and because at root it is decidedly antidemocratic there can be no thought of succession. The “dear leader” is the only hope. The politics of eternity governs Putin’s Russia. It also, most certainly, governs Donald Trump’s MAGA vision for the United States.

Snyder is unforgiving towards Trump in The Road to Unfreedom, but hardly unfair, although he goes further than many dare in positioning Trump in Putin’s orbit. In a famous 2016 debate exchange, Hillary Clinton accused Trump of being Putin’s puppet, and the Trump that emerges here is not unlike a more malevolent (if less bright) incarnation of Pinocchio fashioned with the fingers of a Geppetto-like Putin. The reader may be forgiven for an eyeroll or two when Snyder posits that it was Putin who crafted the fictional character “Donald Trump successful businessman” who was then marketed to the American public as a political candidate. But that hardly seems an exaggeration when you learn that it was actually Putin who first floated the canard of Obama’s forged birth certificate, the banner of Trump’s political rise. That policies that opposed NATO, decried the EU, championed Brexit, demonized Islam, the LGBTQ community, and immigrants—all central to the MAGA machine—almost perfectly aligned and still align with Putin propaganda. To channel The Godfather, it turns out that it was not Barzini all along, but Vladimir Putin.

And again, so many of the “roads to unfreedom” lead through Ukraine. Snyder reminds us that the last advisor to the last pro-Russian president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, who fled to Russia when he was deposed, was none other than Paul Manafort, who then became the campaign manager to fictional candidate “Donald Trump successful businessman.” It was then, Snyder goes on, that Manafort “oversaw the import of Russian-style political fiction … It was also on Manafort’s watch that Trump publicly requested that Russia find and release Hillary Clinton’s emails. Manafort had to resign as Trump’s campaign manager after it emerged that he had been paid $12.7 million in off-the-books cash by Yanukovych … In 2018, Manafort was convicted of eight counts of federal crimes and pled guilty to two more, conspiracy and obstruction of justice, in a deal made with federal prosecutors.” [p236]

It is remarkable that Snyder’s book, published in 2018, anticipates so much of what is to come, and not only the Russian tanks that rolled into Ukraine. The so-called “Mueller Report” that investigated Russian interference in the 2016 election may not have found a smoking gun with Putin fingering the grip, but it did deem Donald Trump guilty of obstruction, even if that outcome was mischaracterized by then Attorney General William Barr. Throughout Trump’s presidency and beyond, Putin has remained his loudest public advocate. And then there was Trump’s “perfect phone call” that attempted to extort Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy for political purposes—the subject of Trump’s first impeachment trial.  Also, on December 23, 2020, just weeks before the end of his presidency and the insurrection he sponsored in a crude attempt to extend his tenure, Trump issued Manafort a full pardon. As this review goes to press, just shortly after the third anniversary of that insurrection, Trump is in the news every day exploiting neofascist themes, threatening dictatorship, declaring the last election stolen, and running for president once more as Vladimir Putin cheers him on from the platform of Russian state TV, while Trump returns the favor at every opportunity. Perhaps the greatest gift comes via his allies in Congress, who are blocking desperately needed American military aid to Ukraine.

There is much more to give us all pause. One common feature of fascism is a celebration of hypermasculinity that also hosts a distinct antifeminism and asserts traditional roles for men and women in society. As Putin’s grip on authoritarianism in Russia grew, so too did scorn for feminists and for those who identified as LGBTQ, as he proclaimed a focus on “traditional family values,” supported by the Russian Orthodox Church, a reliable ally for his one-man rule as well as his war on Ukraine. Fascists poke fun at the soft, decadent underbelly of effeminate liberalism, hurling the expletive “cuck” at the male who does not live up to their patriarchal ideal of the man’s man. Today, sadly, that curse is no less likely to be heard on the avenues of Atlanta than it is on the streets of Moscow. Putin, who reportedly enjoys the sympathetic coverage he has come to expect from FOX News, likely chuckled to himself watching a 2021 episode when former FOX host Tucker Carlson mocked the “maternity flight suits” of pregnant women serving in the armed forces, lecturing that our military had become soft and feminine, in contrast to those of our adversaries that were tough and masculine. Of course, Putin is likely not laughing as hard these days as young Ukrainian women, some former fashion models, are at the front gunning down Russian soldiers daily.

Donald Trump is known to frequently employ projection as a defense mechanism. When Hillary dubbed him a Putin puppet, he shot back with “You’re the puppet!” When in a speech to mark the anniversary of the January 6th insurrection President Biden branded Trump a “threat to democracy,” Trump countered that it was Biden instead who was the threat to democracy. Putin is an expert at this craft, although naturally he is more articulate and his phrasing more elegant than Trump’s. Snyder notes that Putin is the master of what he calls “schizo-fascism,” that has fascists re-branding their enemies as fascists, as when Putin has styled has invasion of Ukraine as an effort to combat resurgent Nazis—despite the fact that Ukrainian president Zelensky is Jewish. Just lie, and then keep recycling the same lie. Rinse and repeat.

It’s hard to find a real flaw in The Road to Unfreedom, other than that some of it strays to the arcane and may challenge the attention span of the popular audience that would most benefit from reading it. There is, however, terrain left unexplored. Putin gets his due as the brilliant villain he turned out to be, but the author overlooks how his rise could have been forestalled by a post-Soviet Russia given to prosperity and stability. The West, basking in the glow of Snyder’s “politics of inevitability,” failed to act consequentially when it could have, in that narrow window between Gorbachev and Putin. I would have liked to see Snyder probe those missed opportunities for economic aid and support for fledgling democratic institutions in Russia, a topic of adept analysis in Peter Conradi’s Who Lost Russia?[3] Also, unlike Conradi, Snyder is unsympathetic to Russian fears stoked by NATO expansion and US withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. These anxieties were certainly opportunistically exaggerated and exploited by Putin, but they nevertheless were and would remain legitimate concerns—even to a democratic Russia. But these are quibbles. In this election year, with the very future of our fragile Republic at stake, read The Road to Unfreedom. It may be too late for Russia, but our vehicle of democracy, if a bit clunky, is still roadworthy, and there’s still time to save America. Let’s step on the gas.

 

[1] Laurence W. Britt, “Fascism Anyone?” Free Inquiry Magazine, [Vol 22 no 2., July 15, 2003] Fascism Anyone?

[2] Link to my review of  The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine, by Serhii Plokhy

[3] Link to my review of  Who Lost Russia?: How the World Entered a New Cold War, by Peter Conradi

PODCAST Review of: Charlie Chaplin vs. America: When Art, Sex, and Politics Collided, by Scott Eyman

https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-58k9f-152d722

Charlie Chaplin vs. America: When Art, Sex, and Politics Collided, by Scott Eyman

Reviewed by Stan Prager, Regarp Book Blog

Review of: Charlie Chaplin vs. America: When Art, Sex, and Politics Collided, by Scott Eyman

Decades before J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI connived for a pretext to deport a wealthy British ex-pat suspected of communist connections who also happened to be an influential, world-famous artist—that person was John Lennon and that attempt ultimately failed—a much younger Hoover and his then-cronies mounted a similar but far more effective crusade against an individual who in his time was even more consequential. That man was British-born Charlie Chaplin, Hollywood’s first truly global phenomenon, who while not deported was yet driven into permanent exile.

Author and film historian Scott Eyman sets out to tell that story and more in Charlie Chaplin vs. America: When Art, Sex, and Politics Collided [2023], an informative and entertaining if uneven portrait of a celebrated figure as devoted to his art as he was indifferent to the enemies he spawned along the way. Seizing upon Chaplin’s clash with the authorities over his politics as the focal point of the narrative, the author seeks to distinguish this work from numerous previous chroniclers of its prominent subject, with mixed results.

Chaplin, both a genius and a giant in the days when cinema was in its infancy, left an indelible mark upon the nascent motion picture industry. In the process, he attracted both critical acclaim and legions of adoring fans, as well as, with equal fervor, the scorn of moralists and the disfavor of those who viewed his brand of social consciousness as a threat to the American way of life. Like the later John Lennon, he was an outsize talent who eschewed convention, dared to take unpopular positions, flaunted a somewhat sybaritic lifestyle, accumulated enormous wealth, and was a legend in his own time—the very ingredients that stoked in alternate audiences parallel passions of adulation and abhorrence.

Anticommunism runs deep in the United States, from the “Red Scare” of the 1920’s to the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)—a creature of the Depression era that was reborn with a fury in the postwar period—and the related excesses of McCarthyism, a nearly continuous stream of panic and paranoia that characterized American culture for decades that ostensibly aimed to identify enemies foreign and domestic but instead extra-constitutionally branded certain political thought as a crime. In the process, thousands of Americans and foreign nationals suffered persecution, ostracism and even imprisonment. A weaker dynamic by Lennon’s time, it nevertheless remained a force to be reckoned with for those so victimized. Something of anachronism, anticommunism yet still echoes into today’s politics. One of the faults in Eyman’s treatment is his failure to place Chaplin’s harassment for his alleged political sympathies into this wider context for the reader unfamiliar with its deeper historical roots.

Neither Chaplin nor Lennon were members of the Communist Party, but that was almost beside the point for authorities who deemed each as unwelcome, if only for their respective advocacies for a greater social and economic equality, which was seen as sympathetic to communist ideology. And there was a whiff of perceived disloyalty in their demeanors. Lennon was ardently anti-war. Chaplin, who styled himself a “peace monger,” was regarded as especially suspect because he never sought US citizenship; instead he railed against nationalism as a root cause of war, and imagined himself as a kind of citizen of the world. Alas, Chaplin had the bad fortune to find himself targeted in tumultuous times characterized by a populace both less sophisticated and more docile than in Lennon’s day. And he paid for it. Of course, as Eyman’s book underscores, objections to Chaplin’s way of life proved far more damning to him than his actual politics.

Charles Spencer Chaplin was born in London in 1889 into abject poverty much like a character out of Dickens. Orphaned by circumstances if not literally, in his childhood he endured the dehumanizing struggle of the workhouse and for a time lived alone on the streets. His older brother Sydney was to rescue him and helped foster his budding stage presence in sketch comedy that eventually took him across the pond, first to vaudeville and later to Los Angeles, where he made his silent film debut. A master of the art of physical comedy, it was there that he invented the trademark character that would define his career and later cement his celebrity—the “Little Tramp,” a good-natured, childlike, sometime vagrant costumed in baggy pants, oversize shoes, and a tiny mustache—that would evolve into an endearing screen icon endowed with a blend of humor and pathos. The Tramp would later serve as the central protagonist for the very first dramatic comedies.

Chaplin was a wildly popular overnight sensation, which by 1915 made him, at only twenty-six years old, one of the highest paid individuals in the world. Just four years later, he joined forces with other leading lights to form United Artists, a revolutionary film distribution company that permitted him to fund and maintain complete creative control over his own productions. UA served as the critical vehicle that enabled Chaplin to write, produce, direct, star in, and even compose the music for a series of films that would make him a legend, including The Kid (1921), The Gold Rush (1925), City Lights (1931), and Modern Times (1936), all featuring the Tramp character. Favoring the subtle artistry of silent films over the “talkies” that came to dominate motion pictures, Chaplin stubbornly continued to produce silent (or mostly silent) movies long after that format had been largely abandoned by others. Eventually he moved to talkies with The Great Dictator (1940), a political satire that starred Chaplin in a dual role as a Tramp-like character and a farcical persona based upon Hitler. Later, he abandoned the Tramp in Monsieur Verdoux (1947), and comedy altogether in the semi-autobiographical Limelight (1952).

In his personal life, Chaplin was a bundle of contradictions. An extremely wealthy but socially conscious man, he was capable of great generosity towards those he favored, but like many who grew up in extreme poverty he could be stingy, as well. It was that childhood abandoned to the streets, according to Eyman and other biographers, that informed every aspect of the mature Charlie Chaplin, in his screen persona as well as his private life. A dominating perfectionist on the set who could be maddening for cast and crew alike with his demands for multiple re-takes of the same scene day after day, and productions that could go on for months or even a year, off camera he was moved by the inequalities of unbridled capitalism, and the plight of the disadvantaged. He advocated for greater economic equity and against the rise of fascism both on screen and off, which made him seem suspect to the powers-that-be, which was further exacerbated by clashes with puritanical movie censors that regarded him as openly flirting with immoral themes. That he was friendly with known communists and campaigned to open a second front to benefit the USSR in the wartime alliance against Hitler only heightened those suspicions and led to accusations that Chaplin himself was a communist or “fellow traveler.”  He once received a subpoena to appear before HUAC, but he was never actually called to testify.

Physically tiny but handsome and charming, Chaplin was something of a womanizer who was frequently unfaithful and had a string of liaisons, sometimes with leading ladies, as well as a total of four marriages. He favored young women: his first two wives were each only sixteen years old when he married them, his fourth wife was eighteen and he was fifty-four when they wed. Other than his infidelities, he seems to have been kind and considerate to his various partners, and he often remained friends and sometimes a financial benefactor to former lovers. His third marriage to actress Paulette Goddard ended in divorce, but she then starred in his next film, and they got along amicably for years to come. The notable exception to that rule was his affair circa 1941-42 with the unstable and vindictive Joan Berry, which led to a career-damaging paternity suit for Chaplin. But he was a devoted and faithful husband to his final wife, Oona O’Neill, with whom he fathered eight children; they stayed together for thirty-four years until his death in Switzerland in 1977 at the age of eighty-eight. Still, the romantic scandals that dogged him—especially the poisonous courtroom drama that played out publicly in his disputes with Joan Berry—tarnished his reputation and bred a whole coterie of enemies in and out of Hollywood willing to work against him when the FBI set its sights on him as an undesirable alien.

As it was, while he championed social justice, Chaplin himself was remarkably apolitical. As the very archetype of the rags-to-riches story, he cited the inherent incongruity of accusing a man who made his fortune via American capitalism of being a communist. But already castigated for his alleged moral turpitude by the doyens of “respectable” society, as the Cold War dawned and the Soviet Union turned from former ally into existential threat, he was widely denounced by detractors and calls grew for him to be deported. Chaplin’s greatest weakness turned out to be his own naivety. When he left for London for the world premiere of Limelight, his re-entry permit was revoked. The grounds for this action were quite tenuous; had he contested it, it is likely he would have been readmitted. But he was so embittered by this affront that he remained in exile from the United States for the rest of his life, returning only once very briefly in 1972 to accept an honorary Academy Award for “the incalculable effect he has had in making motion pictures the art form of this century.”

The problem with Charlie Chaplin vs. America is that despite what may have been his original intentions, it is not completely clear what kind of book Scott Eyman ultimately sent to press after he rested his pen. The subtitle presumes it to be a chronicle of Chaplin’s dual with the established order to avoid banishment, but that theme hardly dominates the plot. On the other hand, there is a wealth of material that hints at what could have been. Much print is devoted to Charlie’s childhood struggles on the streets of London, as well his grand success with the production of The Kid, but there is little connective tissue of points in between, leaving the formative Chaplin mostly conspicuous in its absence. So it cannot be termed an authoritative biography. Likewise, there are sometimes lengthy excursions to focus on a particular movie or a specific film technique, while others are glossed over or ignored. So it cannot be a critical study of Chaplin’s filmmaking. It is as if Eyman bit off far more than he wanted to chew and ended up uncertain what should be spit out, with some chunks of the account too fat and others too lean.

The result is a narrative that is sometimes choppy, with a tendency at times to clumsily slip in and out of chronology, and a penchant in places to fall into extended digressions—including an awkward multipage interview excerpt with a Chaplin associate that might better have been relegated to the back matter of notes or appendix. Still, warts and all, the book never grows dull. The reader may be left unsatisfied, but ever remains engaged. And, to his credit, Eyman succeeds superbly in capturing Chaplin’s personality, by far the most significant challenge for any biographer. That is in itself a notable achievement, especially with a subject as nuanced as this one.

J. Edgar Hoover died in 1972, some twenty years after Chaplin’s re-entry permit was denied. John Lennon was ordered out of the country in 1973, but a New York judge reversed the deportation order in 1975. Earlier that same year, HUAC was formally terminated. After some quiet years, Lennon was making a musical comeback when he was murdered by a deranged fan in 1980. He was only forty years old. By then Chaplin had been dead for three years, at a ripe old age, but his creative juices had never really flowed the same way in exile. He made two additional films abroad, but neither lived up to his earlier triumphs.

Modern Times (1936)

Charlie Chaplin could be the most famous movie star in history whose films most Americans alive today have never seen, largely because even in my 1960s boyhood, when Chaplin still walked the earth, and when most broadcasts outside of prime time were devoted to old movies, silent films were already long passé, and most of his greatest films were silents.  With that in mind, along with reading Eyman’s book I screened several Chaplin films: The Kid, City Lights, Modern Times, and The Great Dictator. I am neither film critic nor film historian, but I consider myself something of a film geek, and I confess that I was blown away by Chaplin’s brilliance in both The Kid and City Lights. While I can understand and appreciate its message and its impact upon release, I found The Great Dictator dated, overly long, and less entertaining. But I would judge Modern Times as not only magnificent, but so extraordinarily timely with its themes of technological oppression, automation, corporate capitalism, threats to individuality, and loss of privacy that it belongs as much to 2023 as it did to 1936. If there is a fault to be found in any of these efforts, it is that Chaplin’s absolute creative control denied him the editorial input that was warranted on occasion. There are slapstick bits, for instance, that while hilarious yet go on interminably. Someone needed to yell “Cut!” Even a genius, as Chaplin indubitably was, needs an editor.

So too, in my opinion, does Scott Eyman. A talented and prolific writer who has authored numerous biographies of stars who once peopled the “Golden Age” of Hollywood, Eyman’s prior accolades could very well be the reason that someone with a sharp red pen did not have the authority to carve out the potentially great book that lay within that sheaf of pages that went to print.

 

[Note: This ARC edition came to me through an early reviewers’ program.]

%%footer%%